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Abstract. Hannah Arendt was fearful not only of a populist President speaking in the name of the 
people and unbound by legality. She was also concerned that the popular will could be harnessed 
to support those responsible for limiting it. More concretely, she was fearful of the American 
Supreme Court relying on popular support. This is the meaning behind her obscure depiction of 
the American Supreme Court as “the true seat of authority in the American Republic” but as 
unfit to power. I argue that Arendt’s characterization of authority as requiring “neither coercion 
nor persuasion” means that the Court’s source of legitimacy is expertise rather than public 
support. Yet the current dominant understanding among American Justices as well as scholars is 
that public support is the source of the Court’s authority. In Arendt’s mind, such an 
understanding means that the Court has become the seat of power. The corruption of the Court’s 
authority and constitutional law as a language of expertise capable of resisting public opinion 
will inevitably follow. Arendt would thus be extremely concerned by the continuing erosion in 
understanding of the American Supreme Court as an expert, and from the rise of the 




Hannah Arendt would view the current reading of The Federalist No. 78 by Americans, and 
especially Supreme Court Justices, as capturing the source of the crisis in which American 
constitutional law is currently in. In recent decades The Federalist No. 78 has been paraphrased 
in the writings of the Justices of the American Supreme Court (hereinafter: the Court), legal 
scholars and political scientists (Bassok 2016; Bassok 2013, 159-61), without even noticing they 
are changing its original meaning. Americans now read The Federalist No. 78 to say that without 
the sword or the purse all the judiciary has is public confidence (see, e.g., Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 817-18 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Gibson, Caldeira, 
                                                          
 Assistant Professor at the School of Law of the University of Nottingham. I am grateful to Mikael Madsen, 
Marlene Wind, and Juan Mayoral for two generous invitations to the iCourts Centre at the University of 
Copenhagen without which this paper would not have been written. I presented earlier drafts at the Trust, Social 
Capital and Networks workshop at iCourts, the Max Weber Tenth Anniversary Conference and the 2017 I-CON 
Conference. Marina Aksenova, Richard Bellamy, Filipe Bastos Brito, Shai Dothan, Dana Schmalz, and Achilles 
Skordas offered valuable comments and assistance. All errors are my own. 




Baird 1998, 343; Karlan 2012, 71). In The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton wrote that without the 
sword or the purse all the judiciary has is merely judgment. Arendt read Hamilton correctly: for 
her, the Court’s reliance on its legal expertise rather than on public support was crucial for the 
survival of the American Republic. In her terms, in order for the American Republic to survive, 
the Court must rely on its authority (expertise in interpreting the Constitution) and not on power 
(public support).  
This article offers three insights on Arendt’s reading of the American Supreme Court. 
First, I use Arendt’s reading of The Federalist No. 78 to show that the current prevailing reading 
of Hamilton’s dictum on the source of the Court’s legitimacy is not merely an innocent 
paraphrasing of Hamilton’s idea. Rather, it represents a major shift in understanding judicial 
legitimacy in the US. Second, I explain Arendt’s fear of a court with power as the fear of a court 
that understands its source of legitimacy in public support. This point has not received any 
attention in scholarly literature thus far. Third, while Arendt’s major fear was of uninhibited 
power – in the sense of public will unbound by any limitations – her writings also expose a fear 
of corrupted authority. Arendt was thus fearful not only of a populist President speaking in the 
name of the people, unbound in fulfilling popular will. She was also concerned that popular will 
could be harnessed to support those responsible for limiting it. Based on this insight, I suggest 
that Arendt would be extremely concerned by the continuing erosion in understanding the 
American Supreme Court as an expert, and from the rise of the understanding that its source of 
legitimacy lies in public confidence.   
 
2. Arendt’s Supreme Court: Authority without Power 
 
Arendt believed that one of the chief reasons for the success of American democracy is that the 
Supreme Court has authority but is powerless (Arendt 1965, 200). It “was especially designed for 
the purpose of authority.” (Arendt 1965, 199).  
In Arendt’s terms, legitimate power resides in the people (Arendt 1965, 179), while the 
“hallmark” of authority, “is unquestioning recognition by those who are asked to obey; neither 
coercion nor persuasion are needed.” (Arendt 1970, 45). Arendt’s description of authority 
captures the traits involved in obeying an expert, such as a doctor. In cases of expert advice, we 
indeed obey without coercion and sometimes even without persuasion (Arendt, 1965, 91). 
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Arendt is not shy in characterizing authority as a hierarchal relationship and writes that 
“[a]uthority…is incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a 
process of argumentation... Against the egalitarian order of persuasion stands the authoritarian 
[or authority-based] order, which is always hierarchical.” (Arendt 1958a, 92-93).   
By closely reading What is Authority?, we can detect that Arendt explicitly writes on 
expertise as the basis for an authority-based relationship. After noting that “[n]owhere else has 
Greek thinking so closely approached the concept of authority as in Plato’s Republic,” Arendt 
discusses several examples that Plato brings to “models of relations”. One of these examples is 
the “physician and the patient” and Arendt notes that “[i]n all these instances either expert 
knowledge commands confidence so that neither force nor persuasion are necessary to obtain 
compliance…” (Arendt 1958a, 108. See also at 116). In a later text, Arendt gives another 
example of a relationship of authority: the relationship between a teacher and a pupil (Arendt 
1970, 144). This relationship may also be characterized as based on expertise.   
According to Arendt, while the Founders of the American Republic wished to imitate 
ancient Rome, in constructing the Court they did not imitate the Roman office of censorship, 
arguably the functional equivalent. Unlike the Justices who are appointed by elected 
representatives, the censor was elected by the Centuriate Assembly for a limited period of time. 
In Arendt’s terms, censores held power because their source of legitimacy was public support 
(Arendt 1965, 200; Volk 2015, 183-85). This was not the model the Founders had in mind for the 
Court, as Arendt concludes: “[i]nstitutionally, it is lack of power, combined with permanence of 
office, which signals that the true seat of authority in the American Republic is the Supreme 
Court.” (Arendt 1965, 200). According to Arendt, the Court does not rely on the people as its 
source of legitimacy but on its expert ability to decipher the Constitution. This interpretative 
ability is what makes the Court worthy of the unquestioning respect awarded to those who hold 
authority, such as experts (Goldoni & McCorkindale 2013, 119, 126). Therefore, when she 
writes that “[a]ll political institutions are manifestations and materializations of power; they 
petrify and decay as soon as the living power of the people ceases to uphold them,” (Arendt 
1970, 41) the emphasis should be put, in order to understand her view of the Court, on the phrase 
“political institutions.” Arendt does not see the Court as a political institution but as an expert. 
In order to fulfil its role as an expert, the Court has to interpret the Constitution according 
to its expert legal knowledge (Arendt 1965, 199; on Arendt’s view of lawyers as experts see 
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Arendt 1965, 237; Scheuerman 1997, 161; Klabbers 2007, 22). This is a legal function, in 
contrast to the political function of the equivalent institution in Rome that held authority, the 
Roman Senate (Arendt 1965, 199-200). But the Senate is also an expert, as Arendt adopts the 
idea that the Roman Senate was akin to a council of elders giving advice to children (Arendt 
1958a, 122-23). The elders’ expertise is in the foundations of Rome (Arendt 1958a, 121-24). As 
we shall see, Arendt also saw the Court as deriving it expertise from understanding American 
foundational moment. In view of all of these analogies between the Court and the Roman Senate, 
it is no wonder then that for Arendt the Roman Senate resembles “Montesquieu’s judiciary 
branch of government, whose power he called ‘somehow nil’…and which nevertheless 
constitutes the highest authority in constitutional governments.” (Arendt 1958a, 122).   
 
3. Arendt’s Reading of The Federalist No. 78 vs. The Current “Reading” of The Federalist No. 
78   
 
Arendt’ view of the Court’s source of legitimacy corresponds well with Alexander Hamilton’s 
The Federalist No. 78. Hamilton famously wrote that “[t]he judiciary on the contrary has no 
influence over either the sword or the purse. . . . It may truly be said to have neither Force nor 
Will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even 
for the efficacy of its judgments.” (Hamilton, Madison, Jay 2009, 392). According to Hamilton, 
the government’s support, essential for the efficacy of the Court’s rulings, is acquired because 
the executive branch acknowledges the value of the Court’s judgment and not because the Court 
holds public support. Even if the Court makes a judgment that is contrary to popular opinion or 
to the government’s interests, the government will still enforce the judgment, in the same way a 
patient complies with a treatment that causes pain because it is recommended by her doctor. Like 
the doctor, the Court, speaks in the name of expertise. Hamilton based the Court’s legitimacy 
“merely” on its legal expertise; not on public support for the Court (Bassok 2013, 373-75). 
Arendt quotes in agreement Hamilton’s dictum and adds “[i]n other words, its very 
authority made it unfit to power, just as, conversely, the very power of the legislature made the 
[US] Senate unfit to extract authority.” (Arendt 1965, 200). According to Arendt, the success of 
the US is that law and power have “clearly recognized different origins, different legitimations, 
and different spheres of application.” (Arendt 1965, 166). The Court’s legal knowledge and 
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detachment from public support made it suitable for legitimacy based on expertise (“authority”), 
while the American Senate’s nature as an elected body made it suitable for legitimacy based on 
public support (“power”) and unfit to extract authority.  
 In The Federalist No. 81, Hamilton objected that the final appeal in cases will be to the 
branch of the legislature (the Senate) in a manner that will be equivalent to the British House of 
Lords that had held judicial power of “last resort.” Hamilton explains that judges as “men 
selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and laborious study”, rather than 
elected representatives, are better equipped to ensure that the Constitution would not be breached 
(Hamilton, Madison, Jay 2009, 408).  Arendt’s position on the difference between the Roman 
Senate and the American Senate represents the exact same logic. The former was not elected and 
thus had authority. In this regard, its equivalent in the US is the judiciary. The American Senate 
may share the same name as the Roman senate since the word “Senate” became “dear” to the 
American founders. But Arendt notes that they have “very little in common.” (Arendt 1965, 199-
200). The “men” elected to the American Senate do not necessarily hold “wisdom,” even though 
the process of discussing opinions at the Senate may in the end produce wise decisions (Arendt 
1965, 227; Volk 2015, 206). 
In the US a development in understanding judicial legitimacy has occurred in recent 
years, a development best captured in the manner in which Hamilton’s dictum is currently 
paraphrased (Bassok 2016). In 2012 Pamela Karlan ends her Harvard Foreword titled 
Democracy and Disdain by saying:  
“Alexander Hamilton was slightly off base when he wrote that the judiciary 
has ‘neither Force nor will but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend 
upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.’ The 
judiciary must ultimately depend on the people.” (Karlan 2012, 71). 
In other words, Karlan views public support as the Court’s source of legitimacy. Even if the 
Court lacks expertise, as long as it holds public support, it will function properly. 
Speaking in the name of the people has been a potent symbol over the course of the 
United States political history (Frank 2010, 4-5). Yet, until the invention of public opinion polls, 
the elected institutions had monopoly over this source of legitimacy (Bassok 2013, 156-59). No 
wonder then that Hamilton’s un-paraphrased dictum – attributing the Court’s legitimacy to its 
expertise – reigned supreme (Bassok 2016, 574-77).  Elsewhere I discuss at length the invention 
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of public opinion polls as the tool that enabled this important and dramatic development in the 
understanding of the Court’s source of legitimacy (Bassok 2016; Bassok 2013). For the purposes 
of this Article that focuses on the dangers Arendt would have seen in such a development, it is 
sufficient to say that today it is a truism to argue that the Court must have public support to 
function properly. Both conservative and progressive justices share the idea that the Court’s 
source of legitimacy rests on its enduring public support (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 [1992], at 865; Bassok 2011, 258-63; Bassok 2016).  This idea has become so powerful in 
American constitutional discourse that it has become commonsensical or natural (Bassok 2011, 
240-41). Most jurists do not even notice, as Karlan did, that they are paraphrasing what Hamilton 
wrote in The Federalist No. 78 to fit this controlling understanding; they simply read Hamilton as 
confirming the controlling paradigm. For modern American readers of Hamilton, the crucial 
question is whether the Court holds sociological legitimacy, that is, whether the public supports 
it. For Hamilton and Arendt, the question was whether the Court has judgment; whether it holds 
expertise. In the next section, I will address the special expertise Arendt attributed to the Court 
and how it ensures the authority of the Constitution.  
  
4.  Arendt as an Identity Originalist  
 
After toppling the king, the French revolutionaries deified the will of the people, which as a 
result served both as the source of power and the source of law. Imagining popular sovereignty 
“in God’s own image” created the danger of a sovereign that can sweep away all legal and 
normative constraints “like a hurricane” (Arendt 1965, 181-86; Kalyvas 2008, 215-17).  In other 
words, all the foundations, including those that the Revolution professed, could be changed as 
long as the will of the people supported such a change (Arendt 1965, 167, 183-84; Arendt 1958a, 
110; Kalyvas 2008, 234-35). In the name of the will of the people – the higher law of the 
revolution – any law could be changed, including laws that were born with the revolution 
(Arendt 1965, 183). The sovereign, after all, is bound by no universal law and acknowledges 
nothing superior to itself (Arendt  1979, 230; Kalyvas 2008, 219-20). In Arendt’s view, this kind 
of unbound popular will is the recipe for a failed constitutional order and catastrophic results, as 
the aftermath of the French Revolution demonstrates. 
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 The success of the American Revolution is the division between law and power. In the 
US, from the outset, “[t]he seat of power to them was the people, but the source of law was to 
become the Constitution…” (Arendt 1965, 157-59). The revolution succeeded in putting law 
above men by creating a constitution that has been worshiped from a very early stage because of 
its connection to the founding moment (Arendt 1965, 183-85, 198-199). In other words, both the 
American and French revolutions held in common “the conviction that source and origin of 
legitimate political power resides in the people.” (Arendt 1965, 179). However, the French 
Revolution failed to realize the need to create an authority that is not based on power coming 
from the people. A stable governmental structure cannot be built on this “quicksand”   (Arendt 
1965, 163; Kalyvas 2008, 219-20). The American “reverent awe” to the act of the founding 
ensured that the Constitution was not dependent on the current will of the people (Arendt 1965, 
204). Subsequently, continuing attempts in the name of the ever-changing “subjective state of 
mind” of the people to dismantle the foundations of the revolution were avoided, as long as these 
foundations were put in constitutional forms (Arendt 1965, 157; Scheuerman 1997, 151, 154). 
According to Arendt, the American Constitution’s endurance over time was achieved 
thanks to the Court’s continuing interpretation of the Constitution that ensured its connection to 
the founding revolution. In Arendt’s words – supposedly quoting Woodrow Wilson1 – the Court 
has functioned as “a kind of Constitutional Assembly in continuous session.” (Arendt 1965, 
200). Arendt argues that, as in Rome, the continuing connection to the founding moment is the 
source of authority: first, the Constitution’s authority, and subsequently also the Court’s (Arendt 
1965, 202-03). For her, the founding is the “fountain of authority” (Arendt 1965, 204), the 
Constitution bears within itself the spirit of the founding, and the Court’s role is to serve as the 
living voice of that origin (Arendt 1965, 231-32; Gottsegen 1994, 124). Arendt is even tempted 
to predict that “the authority of the republic will be safe and intact as long as the act itself, the 
beginning as such, is remembered whenever constitutional questions in the narrower sense of the 
word come into play.” (Arendt 1965, 204).  
In order for the Court to fulfil its role of connecting current America to the founding, 
Arendt offers a mechanism that is very similar to an interpretative system that today we call 
“originalism” (cf. Burns, 167, 171, 174-75). But Arendt’s originalism is of a special kind. 
Through an “origin-oriented” interpretative theory, Arendt wants to ensure a thread connecting 
                                                          
1 As I elaborate below, Arendt’s quote is inaccurate.  
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original American identity and current American identity. I dub this sub-type of originalism: 
identity originalism (Bassok 2015a, 297-302). In the process of constitutional interpretation, 
originalists give a central place to the way the Constitution was understood originally, during the 
founding generation. However, some of them reject the idea that the Constitution is an identity 
manifesto and view originalism as merely a technique to interpret a legal text (Solum 2011, 74; 
McGinnis & Rappaport 2012: 750); others accept the Constitution’s central role in American 
identity but reject the notion that the founding plays such a central role in constructing current 
American identity (Balkin 2011, 74-81). For identity originalists, the Constitution is the focal 
point of American identity and originalism is the roadmap to American identity. According to 
identity originalists, by reading the Constitution according to its original meaning, the Court 
ensures the continuing fidelity to the original American identity (Bassok 2015a, 297-98, 302). To 
fulfil this role, identity originalists maintain that the Justices hold expertise in constitutional 
history and thus, in essence, the Justices are experts in American original identity (Berger 1977, 
8-9, 18).  
Arendt’s identity originalism fits well with her analogy between the Court and the Roman 
Senate since Arendt saw the Roman Senators as also guided by Rome’s past in their role of 
making sure that Rome’s law are in line with the city’s founding principles (Goldoni & 
McCorkindale 2013, 120-21). Arendt explains that the Senate’s authority in Rome is to be 
understood according to the origins of the word “authority” which point to the notion of 
augment: the act of enlarging a foundation (Lara 2013, 105, 108). Similarly, the Court’s 
interpretative authority is derived from its role to conserve, “increase and enlarge” the most 
concrete achievement of the original act of foundation (Arendt 1965, 201; Scheuerman 1997, 
158; Gottsegen 1994, 124). The Court conserves the link to the original understanding of the 
founding moment; ensuring that the original spirit of the Revolution continues to serve as a 
central part of American existence. In the absence of frequent constitutional amendments, the 
main way to reiterate the act of foundation is through the Court’s originalist constitutional 
interpretation (Arendt 1965, 202).  
Writing at the high point of the Warren Court, Arendt notes on the Court’s failure to fulfil 
this promise of “remembering the revolutionary spirit” (Arendt 1965, 231-32, 239). In Arendt’s 
view, adopting identity originalism does not create a problem of being bound to that dead hand 
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of the past since the current loyalty of the people to the Constitution is to be understood in terms 
of choosing to bind “themselves back to a beginning.” (Arendt 1965, 198).  
Detecting the connection Arendt creates between the revolutionary “fountain of 
authority,” the Constitution, and the Court’s interpretative method answers queries in scholarly 
literature regrading her supposedly disregard of the question of ultimate interpretative authority 
(Frank 2010, 54-55). Arendt did not neglect this question. Rather, she believed that the Court 
was entrusted with the role of ensuring the connection to the founding constituting moment. 
True, this view does not sit well with her position favoring extra-institutional politics (Arendt 
1958b, 230).  Arendt’s latter position better fits a system of weak judicial review (Volk 2015, 
246-48) combined with popular constitutionalism that takes “the people themselves to be the 
ultimate authority on questions of legal interpretation.” (Frank 2010, 54, 57-58). Yet, as 
explained above, this is not Arendt’s position with regard to the American Supreme Court. Her 
position regarding the American Court may be partly a result of her doubts of the American 
public’s ability to maintain alive the spirit of the revolution in view of their impoverished 
political experience in times of “regular” politics (Arendt 1975; Sitton 1987, 81-82). This 
reading of American political reality is part of her general view of the modern state as going 
through a process of de-politicization (Arendt 1958b, 28-33; Kalyvas 2008, 208-09). The current 
modern public arena can produce only “moods of the masses” rather than proper opinion 
formation, as could be achieved according to her plan of council democracy (Arendt 1965, 221; 
Sitton 1987, 81-82, 93). Arendt thus creates a distinction between “public opinion” in the sense 
of uneducated public moods and public opinions which are the result of a process of open 
discussion and public debate (Arendt 1965, 268-69; Sitton 1987, 85).  
Arendt does not deny that the Constitution can be approached “from many different 
angles, and upon which one could impose many different interpretations…,” but the Court’s 
interpretations are not to be guided by the will of the people (Arendt 1965, 157). The 
Constitution is “subject to the will of a majority” no more than a “building is…subject to the will 
of its inhabitants.” (Arendt 1965, 164). She summarizes that the Constitution “has remained a 
tangible worldly entity of greater durability than elections or public-opinion polls.” (Arendt 
1965, 157). Without the Constitution as an Archimedean point of authority, without the Court 
using identity originalism to connect current America to its founding, a new founding may occur 
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whenever there is a strong enough difference of opinion. A revolution would be lurking at every 
corner.  
Public opinion must be kept at bay according to Arendt and the Court holds a key role in 
ensuring this result. But what is the problem with a court that views its legitimacy as based on 
public support without necessarily following public opinion in concrete cases? Arendt’s answer 
to this question is not explicit. Her writings make very clear the inherent contradiction between 
the Constitution as an Archimedean point of authority and the hurricane of public opinion. My 
analysis explained the role of the Court in maintaining the connection between the Constitution 
and the founding moment and thus ensuring the Constitution’s ability to maintain its authority. 
By explaining Arendt’s reading of Hamilton’s The Federalist No. 78 I was also able to decipher 
Arendt’s saying that the Court is the true seat of authority but unfit to power. While Arendt’s 
intuition on the Court being unfit to power is very appealing in view of this analysis, I argue that 
with more interpretative work another layer can be exposed in Arendt’s writing, a layer that 
explains the danger of a Court holding power. 
        
5. The Danger Lurking 
In her writings, Arendt directly deals with two dangers that threaten the Court’s ability to fulfil 
its function (Goldoni & McCorkindale 2013, 125-31). First, her concern that the Court was 
exceeding its role as the interpreter of the Constitution in the context of the school de-
segregation decisions (Arendt 1958-59). Second, her concern that the Court cannot practice its 
authority in crucial political issues such as the Vietnam War (Arendt 1972, 99-101). While these 
dangers were of the Court not fulfilling or exceeding its authoritative role, the current danger 
facing the Court is of a different kind. The current danger – as expressed in the shift in reading 
The Federalist No. 78 – is of a court with power i.e., a court that switches its understanding of its 
source of legitimacy from expertise to public support. Since Gallup began tracking public 
support for the Court and its decisions in a systematic way only during the 1960 (Marshall 2008, 
1–2, 29, 77), Arendt was unable to detect the influence of measuring public support for the Court 
on its understanding of judicial legitimacy. Yet, while she did not address this danger directly, 
we can distill her position towards it from her view of the Court’s proper role. 
Arendt agrees that “public opinion as the greatest force ruling an egalitarian democratic 
society” is one of the few principles that had survived from the principles of the Revolution, 
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“after the revolutionary spirit had been forgotten.” (Arendt 1965, 221). She stresses that “in the 
last analysis,” all authority rests on opinion in the sense that every regime requires public 
confidence (Arendt 1965, 230). Of course, such a statement does not mean that each separate 
institution requires public confidence. As Owen Fiss explained in a democracy “consent is not 
granted separately to individual institutions. It extends to the system of governance as a whole. 
Although the legitimacy of the system depends on the people’s consent, an institution within the 
system does not depend on popular consent.” (Fiss 1985, 43-44; see also Fiss 1979, 38).  
 Arendt was very aware of the danger in democracy’s “inclination to be swayed by public 
opinion and mass sentiments.” (Arendt 1965, 225). In view of this danger, she quotes a letter by 
Hamilton in which he speaks of “a permanent body [that] can check the imprudence of 
democracy.” (Arendt 1965, 225). Arendt admits that “[t]he institution originally designed to 
guard against rule by public opinion or democracy was the Senate.” (Arendt 1965, 226). Yet, the 
Supreme Court has become in practice the “lasting institution for judgment” that offers “judicial 
control” over public opinion (Arendt 1965, 228-29).  
Arendt fears that a court guided by the logic of public opinion would fail to ensure the 
stability of the foundation i.e., of the Constitution. After all, the Constitution was created as a 
“written document, an endurable objective thing…never a subjective state of mind, like the will.” 
(Arendt 1965, 157). It was designed to remain “a tangible worldly entity of greater durability 
than elections or opinion polls.” (Arendt 1965, 157). The Constitution has an inbuilt amendment 
mechanism that makes it relatively immune to public opinion except on rare occasions.2 If the 
Court becomes an agent of public opinion, this entire structure is put in jeopardy.  
Analyzing a point Arendt made in her short and controversial article Reflection on Little 
Rock further exposes the contradiction Arendt saw between authority based on expertise and 
public opinion.  In this article, written following the Supreme Court decision to desegregate 
schools in the South, Arendt argues that the Court was mistaken in interfering in the private and 
social realm (Arendt 1958-59, 242). She writes that “[t]o force parents to send their children to 
an integrated school against their will means to deprive them of rights which clearly belong to 
them in all free societies – the private right over their children and the social right to free 
association.” (Arendt 1958-59, 242). The details of Arendt’s controversial position towards de-
                                                          
2 For reasons of simplicity I avoid discussing the issue of constitutional amendment outside of Article V. However, 
even those, such as Bruce Ackerman, who espouse this road for amending the Constitution, do put limitations on 
public will that are akin to those put by the formal amendment process. See Bassok 2015a, 307-11. 
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segregation are not the focus here. I would like to focus on Arendt’s argument that the Court’s 
interference affected the relationship between children and their teachers and parents, since as 
explained above, this type of relationship demonstrated for Arendt an authority-type relationship. 
Arendt writes under the plausible premise that in the South in that period, white parents 
supported segregation. Hence, she concludes that “[t]he conflict between a segregated home and 
a desegregated school, between family prejudice and school demands, abolishes at one stroke 
both the teachers’ and the parents’ authority, replacing it with the rule of public opinion among 
children who have neither the ability nor the right to establish a public opinion of their own.” 
(Arendt 1958-59, 243). If we make an analogy between the Court’s authority and the teachers or 
parents’ authority, we can conclude that if the Court’s authority based on expertise erodes, we 
are doomed to the control of public opinion. 
 Of the danger of public opinion controlling an institution with authority we can learn 
from a reference Arendt makes to Kant in her essay What is Authority? Discussing Plato’s 
philosopher-king figure as an example closely approaching the concept of authority (Arendt 
1958a, 106-07), Arendt notes that “this combination of reason and rule implied a danger to 
philosophy as well” and not merely to the political realm (Arendt 1958a, 107). The philosopher-
king’s attempt to rule according to reason presents a danger to reason. But what is this danger? 
Arendt notes that Kant’s discussion of Plato is the only reference to this danger. She proceed to 
quote Kant, “[i]t is not to be expected that kings philosophize or that philosophers become kings, 
nor is it to be desired, because the possession of power corrupts the free judgment of reason 
inevitably.” (Arendt 1958a, 107). In other words, we can expect the legal language to be 
corrupted if the Court understands its source of legitimacy to lie in power (public support).  
In order to better understand this point, I will use an analogy frequently made between 
judges and doctors, and medicine and law (e.g., Kahn 1997, 126; Richman 2009, 1731). In recent 
years medicine has encountered a challenge to its autonomy as a distinct language of expertise, 
with the introduction of a metric measuring doctors’ performance based on patients’ opinions 
(Schoenfelder 2012). Over the last two decades in the US, measurements of “patient care 
experience” or “patient satisfaction” have become more and more prevalent in many hospitals 
and organizations (Price 2014, 523-24). Some of these programs even give financial bonuses 
based on the level of patient satisfaction (Schoenfelder 2012; Price 2014, 523).  
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The results of the entrance of public opinion polls into the medical profession are a mixed 
bag and highly disputed. A study from 2012 titled The Cost of Satisfaction summarizes several 
studies conducted following the introduction of this metric, noting that “[s]atisfied patients are 
more adherent to physician recommendations and more loyal to physicians, but research suggests 
a tenuous link between patient satisfaction and health care quality and outcomes.” (Fenton 2012, 
405. Cf. Price 2014, 534). The study goes further than its literature review and, based on a 
national sample, shows that the highest level of patient satisfaction is associated with greater 
prescription drug costs and overall health care expenditure. Furthermore, it is associated with 
higher overall mortality compared to those with the lowest levels of satisfaction (Fenton et al. 
2012, 405-09).   
In a study from 1997, doctors prescribed antibiotics to patients presenting acute 
respiratory illness, even though in many of these cases they judged the antibiotics to be 
unnecessary. The study suggests that over-prescription is a result of doctors taking into account 
their understanding of patients’ expectations and satisfaction (Holmes 1997, 1211-1214). 
Another study examined the imaging exams prescribed by physicians for patients with 
uncomplicated acute lower back pain. One central conclusion was that “patients cared for by 
physicians exposed to incentives based on patient satisfaction received more rapid and advanced 
imaging” even though such an examination “may not benefit patients and may result in harm.” 
(Pham 2009, 972, 977). 
No doubt, from time immemorial, patients’ assessments of doctors were based not only 
on assessing their professional expertise. Patients were also interested in their physicians’ ability 
to communicate and behave in a caring fashion. Yet, the ability to measure these assessments in 
fungible units that allow for a comparison between doctors has corrupting effects on the 
language of medicine. In Arendtian terms, doctors’ attempt to ensure their power leads to the 
corruption of their language of medical expertise. Similarly, courts and politicians spoke of 
public confidence in courts well before the invention of public opinion polls (Bassok 2013, 158-
59). Yet, the ability to measure public opinion has the potential to lead to a court that views its 
source of legitimacy in the people; in Arendtian terms, this is a court with power. Such a court in 
may corrupt law as a language of expertise. 
The language of law has aspired to function as a language of expertise. In languages of 
expertise, the question of which argument is proper or legitimate cannot be determined by 
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popular will or by popular use of an argument. Expert knowledge must be determined by the 
community of experts according to their rules of their discipline (Post 2012, xii-xiv, 8, 29–32). 
The entry into legal language through the legislation process is dependent on popular will, but 
the separation of law and politics after the legislative process is aimed to create an autonomous 
field for a language of expertise (Bassok, 2015b). In this manner, the legal language creates a 
space of argumentation controlled by experts rather than by public opinion. In Arendtian terms 
this is the language of authority rather than a language of power. But just as the philosopher king 
would corrupt reason if given a chance to rule, a court guided by power would corrupt the 
systematic-rational character of the legal language (Volk 2015, 111-24).  
  
6. Competing Interpretations of Arendt’s Writings on the Court 
  
Before concluding, I would like to discuss several conflicting interpretations of Arendt’s analysis 
of the American Supreme Court. As opposed to Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato’s argument, 
Arendt did not suggest that the Court functions as “a constituent assembly” that rewrites the 
constitution as a “constitution of judges.” (Arato and Cohen 2009, 317). While I have great 
respect for the work done by Cohen and Arato over the years, their reading of Arendt on this 
point is based on two mistakes. First, Arato and Cohen misquote Arendt’s reference to Wilson. 
They write that she is quoting Wilson depicting the Court as “a constituent assembly in 
permanent session.” They add their reading of this quote to mean that the Court is “also an organ 
capable of usurping sovereignty.” (Arato and Cohen 2009, 317). The quote is not what Wilson 
said and not how Arendt quoted him. Based on a quote from Corwin, Arendt quotes Wilson to be 
saying that the Court is “a kind of Constitutional Assembly in continuous session.”3 The 
difference between a “constituent assembly” and a “constitutional assembly” is important.4  A 
continuous session of the former means an ongoing project of redefining the polity’s foundations 
                                                          
3 Arendt also misquotes the quote that Corwin brings. Corwin writes that “Indeed, the Supreme Court by its decision 
interpreting the Constitution, constantly alters the practical effect and application thereof. As Woodrow Wilson aptly 
put it, the Supreme Court is ‘a kind of Constitutional Convention in continuous session.’” (Corwin 1958, 5). Clearly, 
Corwin did not refer to Wilson to insinuate that the Court redefines the constitutive features of the American 
Republic. Rather, the Court merely interprets them in the application of the Constitution. 
4 Arato and Cohen partly fix the quote in a later edition of their article. Although they still speak of Arendt as a 
supporter of “a constitution of judges,” now Arendt is quoted as quoting Wilson saying that the Court is “a kind of 
constitutional assembly in permanent session.” (Arato and Cohen 2010, 161). While the first part of the quote is now 
fixed, the second part is still mistaken. Arendt wrote: “continuous session.” 
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(Kalyvas 2008, 203, 229-30).5 This would very much contradict Arendt’s view of the American 
Constitution and the Court as measures of permanence and stability (Arendt 1965, 228-29; 
Scheuerman 1997, 158). A “constituent assembly” predates and precedes the constitutional order 
(Arendt 1958b, 199). For these reasons, Arendt did not see the Court as a constituent assembly 
capable of redefining the principles constitutive of the American Republic. Rather, she saw it as 
continuing the constitutional endeavor as defined by the revolutionary spirit. She speaks of a 
“continuous session” – rather than of a “permanent session” as Cohen and Arato attribute to her 
– since she views the Court as protecting and building on the original act of foundation 
(Scheuerman 1997, 158).  
Second, Arendt speaks of the Court as “a kind of Constitutional Assembly” (my 
emphasis) when she attempts to explain the Court’s authority or special status in connection to 
the founding. This depiction is focused on the Court’s source of authority rather than its function, 
as Cohen and Arato read it. As for the Court’s function, according to Arendt, the Court should 
interpret the Constitution in a manner that ensures a continuing thread from the founding era and 
not re-write the Constitution (as the phrase “constitution of judges” used by Cohen and Arato 
implies).  
I also partly differ from William Scheuerman’s reading of Arendt on this point. After 
describing Arendt’s view of the Court’s authority as “hierarchical” rather than based on 
persuasion, Scheuerman explains that “[i]t is difficult to imagine what status such a conception 
of authority can rightfully possess in a modem, disenchanted democratic polity: particularly in a 
democracy, only argumentation and discursive ‘persuasion’ can legitimately justify the exercise 
of state power.” (Scheuerman 1997, 159). Scheuerman adds that the Court can thus be viewed as 
asserting traditional forms of political domination (Scheuerman 1997, 159). Arendt would argue 
that Scheuerman simply fails to understand the essence of authority that is based on expertise. 
The sign of expert authority is what Scheuerman views as illegitimate domination. Arendt admits 
that the meaning of authority as she uses the word “has vanished from the modern world.” 
(Arendt 1958, 91). She writes that “the old time-honored metaphors and models for authoritarian 
                                                          
5 It is unfortunate that Klyvas, who emphasizes the distinction between “constitutional” and “constituent” power, 
reads Arendt’s quote of Wilson as saying that the “the Court is a kind of continuous constituent power” in a manner 
similar to Cohen and Arato’s misreading (Kalyvas 2008, 279). This leads him to attribute to Arendt inconsistencies 
that do not exist in her analysis. 
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relations,” such as that between teachers and pupils, “have lost their plausibility.” (Arendt 1958, 
92). 
Scheuerman further argues that On Revolution presents a picture in which “the ongoing 
‘constitutional conversation’ of the Supreme Court represents an augmentation of the ‘mutual 
deliberation’ basic to the act of founding itself,” whereas in What is Authority? Arendt presents 
authority as “incompatible with persuasion.” (Scheuerman 1997, 158). As explained above, 
Arendt’s model of authority does not change in On Revolution, as evident from the teacher-pupil 
example that adheres to her earlier writings on the authority (see also Arendt 1965, 279). 
Christian Volk reads Arendt through the prism of “dehierarchisation” and views the 
Court as part of such an apparatus (Volk 2015, 159, 177-80, 214-15, 225, 229, 244-48).  This 
reading attempts to fit Arendt to current trends in understanding courts as institutions that 
enhances deliberative democracy. In his view, rather than being autorotative experts, the Court is 
part of an ongoing constitutional interpretative discourse with other institutions, as well as with 
the people themselves (Kramer 2004). Whether this view reflects reality or not, it is a misreading 
of Arendt as it fails to take seriously her hierarchical understanding of authority and her 
emphasis that the Court was created to hold authority. Moreover, saying that the Court’s 
authority relies on its connection to the founding moment, and in that sense it functions as “a 
kind of Constitutional Assembly,” does not mean that its current function includes “mutual 
deliberation” with the people. The Court does not recreate the founding moment in its work by 
recreating a “mutual deliberation” with the people. Commitment to the founding moment in 
terms of the Court’s interpretative theory does not mean that the Court needs to recreate a 
deliberative process in its practice because of the mutual deliberation that arguably was prevalent 
during the founding era. Adhering to identity originalism as an interpretative system does not 
entail an adoption (and in some ways it even contradicts) of the model of a dialogue between the 
Court and the people of here and now. Similarly, as opposed to Scheuerman’s claim 
(Scheuerman 1997, 160), Arendt’s dismay at “[t]he constitution of experts under which Europe 
came to live after the First World War” (Arendt 1965, 144) does not contradict giving the Court 
the authority to keep the connection to the founding based on its interpretative expertise. The 
notion of “constitution of experts” in Europe after the First World War expressed the 
understanding that the failure of constitutions to guard democracy before the second world, 
especially in Weimar Germany, was the result of their creation by experts without the 
17 
 
involvement and the support of the public (Feuchtwanger 1993, 39; Arendt 1965, 144-45). 
Arendt’s whole point is that in the US, the Court’s role is to connect the present reading of the 
Constitution to its founding moment, a moment that captures the will of the people. While the 
Court’s role in not to re-write the Constitution and to make it a constitution of judges or experts, 
the Court is relying on its expertise when interpreting the Constitution to connect its present 




The picture Arendt dreaded in her insistence on the need to separate power from authority was 
one in which the will of the people roams with no restrains and is able to define and redefine the 
foundations. This was her depiction of France under Robespierre and to some extent her 
understanding of Germany in the early years under Hitler (Burns 1987, 175). In common with 
many of her Jewish contemporaries who experienced the collapse of the Weimar Republic, 
Arendt was preoccupied by a scenario in which a popular elected president would reconstitute 
the state’s foundations, speaking in the name of an allegedly superior popular mandate as a 
source of legitimacy (Arato and Cohen 2009, 313; Volk 2015, 167-72). Arendt was part of a 
general tendency of German state theory to focus on the question of political order (Volk 2015, 
15-16, 249). Yet Arendt feared from a specific danger of power gaining authority.  
The picture I have presented in this article is of judicial authority gaining power. The 
Court – which speaks in the name of the constitutional foundations – is now understood to rely 
on public support as its source of legitimacy. Rather than having “merely expertise,” it holds 
“public confidence.” This was not a picture Arendt envisioned, since the regular measurement of 
public support for the Court in opinion polls that enabled such a shift had just begun at the time 
she was writing. At first glance, this development seems not only not dangerous but perhaps 
even positive. The least dangerous branch had just become stronger. Yet probing Arendt’s 
argument exposes a danger: the corruption of the language of authority once power affects the 
Court. Measuring doctors’ performance by patient satisfaction demonstrated the danger of 
corrupting the medical discipline. Similarly, the legal language of expertise is in danger of 
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